 |
-
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Christmas was not so good for James Sandlin. On December 22, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed his bank fraud conviction in what seems to me a highly unusual case. U.S. v. Sandlin, No. 08-41277 (5th Cir.) (Op. filed December 22, 2009). Sandlin was a developer who applied for a loan to a bank in Sherman, Texas. In his loan packet, he acknowledged having more debt than he disclosed, but failed to list the additional debt. In fact, Sandlin had a near $1 million undisclosed loan outstanding on a piece of property he pledged as collateral to the bank. But wait, at trial, bank representatives testified the bank suffered no loss, they considered their loan to be fully collateralized (despite the undisclosed $1 million debt); in their view Sandlin was not required to list the $1 million debt; and besides, no one in the bank ever reviewed the alleged "false" document in question. Nonetheless, the jury convicted Sandlin of two counts of fraud. In affirming the conviction, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was Sandlin's intent, not that of the bank that mattered, so even if the bank was not concerned with the omission, Sandlin still knew the application was false and that was enough to prove fraud. Sandlin's trial defense appears from the opinion to have been that he had "forgotten" about the $1 million debt at the time of application. That defense failed when the government proved that Sandlin was making monthly interest payments on this loan and had paid nearly $100,000 in interest on that loan the previous year. It seems to me that a better defense would have been to concentrate more on the bank's conduct and less on Sandlin's faulty memory. Everyone is aware of the "winks and nods" that sometimes accompany the lending process. Sandlin could have defended on what the bankers told him and what he understood their expectations to be. That testimony would have mirrored the bankers' own testimony that they did not care about the extra debt. There simply can be no fraud without deception or an intent to deceive by the borrower. The bottom line here is that Sandlin's "I forgot" defense missed the mark. Defending these cases requires an understanding of the system, expectations of the players (stated and unstated), and the ability to exploit that information to the client's advantage. Until next time, Todd
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Monday, September 14, 2009
Please find a link below to the executive summary of the Inspector General's report on the SEC's alleged failure to discover the Madoff Ponzi scheme earlier than it did. The report discusses but quickly dismisses the romantic relationship between SEC Assistant Director Eric Swanson and Bernard Madoff's niece, Shana Madoff, as a factor in the misfeasance, but does fault, appropriately, the SEC for failing to recognize multiple, obvious signs of the Ponzi scheme. It also sadly notes that even when the SEC decided to take action, it failed to do so for no apparent reason. One has to wonder how many millions of dollars and hundreds of victims would have been spared if the process had worked like it is supposed to. The ultimate irony is that Madoff used the SEC's failures to take any action against him as marketing materials to convince equivocal investors of the safety of investing with him. To me, this report proves yet again the potential fallibility of government and institutional investigations. We will see more reports like this as mortgage and bank fraud cases wind through the system and institutional practices of the lenders which avoid knowledge of obvious risk are exposed. I recently gave a lecture on this at the annual meeting of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Boston (if anyone is interested in seeing any of the materials, let me know.) Bottom line, next time there is a claim of institutional regularity or that a presumption of governmental competence should apply to a matter, keep in mind the names Madoff, Ameriquest, and Aisenberg. Until next time, Todd Link: Executive Summary.pdf
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Monday, August 24, 2009
In a recent address to the New York City Bar Association, Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, gave clear warning of the aggressive response the SEC is taking to the current financial downturn. Mr. Khuzami announced the creation of specialized enforcement units in the following areas of securities law: 1) Asset Management 2) Market Abuse 3) Structured and New Products 4) Foreign Corrupt Practices 5) Municipal Securities and Public Pensions. He also detailed new incentives to inspire "cooperation" by individuals in enforcement actions, but quickly cautioned lawyers and our clients not to expect leniency simply because the client is a "good guy" or "all our competitors do it" or "we've always done it this way." As far as priorities, the Director noted that responding to the current mortgage and credit crisis remains the highest priority of the Division of Enforcement, but Ponzi schemes, as exposed in Madoff, Stanford, and arguably in Nadel, remain a top priority. See attached PDF for full draft of the remarks of Robert Khuzami. Bottom line: the SEC has been embarrassed in the recent past and won't want to be again. Look for stepped up enforcement and increasing numbers of joint SEC/Department of Justice investigations. Every criminal securities case I have had started as an SEC enforcement action. It is important for counsel to recognize the potential for a criminal referral to the Department of Justice early on and work to eliminate that possibility, or at least, minimize the exposure. Involving criminal counsel at the earliest stages is essential to preserve important testimony, defenses, and resources of the client. Until next time, Todd Download the PDF File WSJ_khuzamispeech08102009.pdf
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
We all remember Massiah v. U.S. from law school. That is the 1964 case where the Supreme Court ruled that the police may not plant an informant in a cell with a represented defendant because it violates the Sixth Amendment. Apparently that landmark decision was excluded from some police manuals in Kansas, because after Donnie Ray Ventris was arrested for murder, an informant was placed into the cell with him and instructed to obtain evidence. After Ventris took the stand at trial and denied involvement in the crime, the prosecution, although conceding the police had "probably violated" the Sixth Amendment by placing the informant in the cell, sought to use the informant as a witness to rebut Ventris' current denials of criminality. The trial court allowed the evidence and Ventris was convicted. In an opinion characterized by the dissent as "another occasion in which the Court has privileged the prosecution at the expense of the Constitution", the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Kansas, which had over-turned Ventris' conviction due to this illegal police tactic. See, Kansas v. Ventris, No. 07-1356, decided April 29, 2009. Declaring the "game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes is not worth the candle", and the need to prevent perjury superior to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this case, the majority reinstated the conviction. I think we all agree that perjury is intolerable. Yet, what about equally intolerable intentional governmental misconduct? Has this case given police an incentive to "cut off" defense testimony through deliberate violation of the Sixth Amendment? Where will it stop? What happens in the next case when the defendant's wife or brother testifies that the accused was at a birthday party and could not be the shooter? Will the concern to prevent perjury open the gate to use the unconstitutionally obtained statement to impeach the wife? What if the defense lawyer merely argues the defendant is innocent, will that be taken as a prosecutor's license to admit illegally obtained evidence to prevent a deception or miscarriage of justice? Is not deterring police misconduct and upholding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel worth the price of the candle that prevents these violations? Bottom line, once a court starts justifying illegal police conduct, it starts down the proverbial slippery slope. Look for prosecutors to begin to use Ventris to justify all sorts of police misdeeds in the interest of preventing perjury and deceptions upon juries and courts. As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, "shabby tactics are intolerable in all cases." Until next time, Todd
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
In a disturbing opinion, a U.S. Court of Appeals has over-turned a writ of habeas corpus in a case where a prosecutor repeatedly made improper references during trial to the defendant's failure to testify in a prior child custody hearing. For example, the prosecutor asked the defendant on cross examination why he chose not to defend his position and "sat there like a bump on a log" during the custody hearing involving his minor daughter. Later, during closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to the defendant as "the guilty man in (family) Court being whispered to by his lawyer saying don't get involved in this, they might find something out". As the crime being tried was a sexual offense against the same child who was the subject of the custody hearing, a federal district judge later issued a writ of habeas corpus freeing the defendant after finding the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination and his due process right to a fair trial. The judge also found trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the State's conduct. Unfortunately, the appellate court quashed the writ, finding the defense had "invited" the prosecutor's wrath by raising a defense that the government had "rushed to judgment" on the facts and the defendant's guilt. This Court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, finding counsel's strategy to pursue this theory was not constitutionally defective. What makes this result troubling is that unlike many cases, the evidence of guilt here was not overwhelming. Indeed, the district judge noted that the verdict came down to who the jury believed, the defendant, or the 12 year old accuser, as they were the only witnesses to the alleged event. There is no doubt that the prosecutor's wrongful attacks damaged the defendant's credibility and likely swung the verdict against him. Net result, the defendant shall serve between 8 to 15 years in the Michigan state penal system. See, Hall v. Vasbinder, __F.3d__ 2009 WL 1066082, C.A.6 (Mich.), April 22, 2009 (NO. 08-1475). Bottom line, this case highlights the danger of ongoing civil proceedings when a client is facing a criminal investigation. We are encountering this frequently with increased litigation over failed investments and development projects. It is often wise for the client to refuse to testify in depositions or civil proceedings, but the matter must be handled such that the client, unlike Mr. Hall, will not spend the next decade or more of his life in prison as a consequence of invoking his constitutional right. Until next time, Todd
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Gant, ruled that police "may only search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." This effectively over-rules New York v. Belton, decided in 1981, which permitted unrestricted searches of vehicles so long as the search was contemporaneous to the arrest of the driver. Belton justified such searches as being incident to arrest and necessary to prevent destruction of evidence and for officer safety. Rodney Gant was arrested for a traffic offense, handcuffed and secured in the back seat of a police vehicle. His car was searched and drugs found in a jacket on the backseat. He moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that since the jacket was outside his reach, its search could not be justified as incident to arrest. The state's relied on Belton's bright line rule. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the defendant's argument, finding no justification for the search. The U.S. Supreme Court also agreed with Rodney Gant, holding that once an arrestee is securely in custody, the police may not search his car incident to arrest unless it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. In cases similar to Gant's, and absent consent, there will never be a permissible search as there is no additional evidence to be found of "the offense of arrest" (driving with an invalid license). Something more will be required to justify a policeman's search of the vehicle. Justice Scalia, concurring, (and I) wonder whether the Court has unwittingly created a situation where police will avoid placing an arrestee in handcuffs in order to avoid Gant and justify searches of arrestees' cars. What threat does this pose to officers, arrestees and passenger safety? (huge) Is this acceptable? (no) How much litigation will this spawn? (a lot) Bottom line: Failing to establish a clear rule to follow in an arrest situation which repeats itself thousands of times daily, the reach of Gant will not be defined for years and only after traveling many divergent paths through the state and federal appellate courts. Justice Scalia is correct; more guidance is necessary. Until next time, Todd
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Friday, April 10, 2009
In a recent memo, the IRS establishes a procedure offering partial amnesty for taxpayers with undisclosed foreign bank accounts. The deadline to apply for the amnesty is September, 23, 2009. Particular attention should be paid to this offer in view of recent disclosures that Swiss Bank UBS holds about 52,000 secret accounts for U.S. persons worth an estimated $14.8 billion, and the IRS is seeking disclosure of this information. To date, UBS has refused to disclose, claiming to do so violates Swiss law and would subject it to criminal and civil penalties. A federal district judge in Miami is yet to rule on the enforceability of the IRS' summons, but my guess, based on other things happening with UBS, is that the IRS will get the information and come calling on those who failed to report the accounts or take advantage of the amnesty. Note that the initial review of eligibility will be performed by the IRS-Criminal Investigation Division (those are the IRS special agents with guns and arrest powers), so this should be approached with care and only by those with knowledge and experience in these areas. Bottom line is, if you have a client with one of these accounts, they need to seriously consider taking advantage of this program.
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
-
Thursday, March 12, 2009
On March 6, 2008, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the bribery and mail fraud convictions of HCA founder Richard Scrushy. In the same opinion, the court reversed the mail fraud convictions of co-defendant and former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman, although Siegelman's bribery and obstruction of justice convictions were affirmed. Siegelman's case was remanded for re-sentencing where the sentencing court will reconsider his seven-year sentence. Scrushy's sentence of more than six years imprisonment stands. U.S. v. Siegelman and Scrushy (No. 07-13163, Op. filed March 6, 2009).
According to the opinion, the bribery count arose from an agreement between Seigelman and Scrushy to appoint Scrushy to the Alabama Certificate of Need (CON) Review Board in exchange for $500,000. The CON Board is responsible for issuing certificates of healthcare need which are required before certain new healthcare facilities can do business in Alabama. Apparently, the former governor had personally guaranteed a large debt incurred in connection with an initiative to convince Alabama voters to approve a statewide lottery to fund educational reform. The opinion describes how the $500,000 was used to offset Siegelman's obligation in exchange for Scrushy's appointment as vice chairman of the CON Board. Permissible limits on payments to political candidates have been the subject of more than one U.S. Supreme Court case. In a political system dependent upon private contributions for campaigns for public office, the line has been drawn at contributions made for an explicit promise by the official to perform or not perform an official act in exchange for the contribution. Siegelman and Scrushy argued that the law requires not only an "explicit" agreement, but also that the agreement to do or refrain from doing an official act be "express". Recognizing that requiring proof of an express agreement would allow bribers to escape criminal liability through the use of "winks and nods", the Eleventh Circuit refused to read this requirement into the statute. The court did reverse Siegelman's mail fraud convictions. Those counts charged that Scrushy and Siegelman agreed that Scrushy would use his position on the CON Board to defraud Alabama of his honest services. Concluding that the government failed to prove this was part of Siegelman's agreement, the court vacated those convictions. You may recall the allegations of partisanship that accompanied this indictment of this former Democratic governor by a Republican appointed U.S. Attorney. In classic strategy, the government offered a deal to a former Siegelman aide facing 10 years in prison on an unrelated extortion case in exchange for his pivotal testimony against the former governor. Allegations have arisen that the prosecution improperly suppressed key impeaching facts about this witness which would have made a difference in the jury's consideration of his credibility. Many considered this prosecution unfair and a group of 52 former state attorney generals asked Congress to investigate whether it was pursued because of politics and not merit. Nonetheless, a jury, district court and three judge appellate panel agreed that a half million dollars was paid in exchange for an explicit agreement to appoint a powerful health care official to a powerful health care board. This Eleventh Circuit's opinion makes clear that explicit agreements to exchange an official action for a campaign contribution is criminal. It goes on, however, to note” in the absence of such an agreement on a specific action, even a close in time relationship between the donation and the act will not suffice. "That is the line in the sand.” It is expected that the Siegelman and Scrushy will seek rehearing and certiorari to the Supreme Court. Bottom line, don't expect or ask for anything in exchange for a campaign contribution, especially a $500,000 contribution.
Full story
Posted by:
Todd Foster
Category:
|
|